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IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD:
LITIGATION IN THE POST-PLACEMENT
ADOPTION SETTING
Introduction
"There is urgent need for a quickened national
conscience and a new national policy with this as a
goal: to nurture well all of our children, in body,
mind and spirit, that we as a people may grow in
wisdom, strength, and humane concerns .... .,,
Having been derived from the civil law, adoption2 is the
statutory process by which existing parental rights and responsibilities
are extinguished and a new parent-child relationship between persons
not related by nature is established.' The general effect of an
adoption decree is to vest all parental rights and duties in the adoptive
© Copyright 1994 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
'Gary B. Melton, Is There a Place for Children in the New World Order?, 7 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 491, 529 n.155 (1993) (quoting NICHOLAS HOBBS,
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: CATEGORIES, LABELS, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 261
(1975)).
2 Adoption is the act of lawfully assuming the parental rights and responsibilities of
another person, usually a child under the age of 18. CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM
L. PIERCE, PHD., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 17 (1991). "An old and
inappropriate definition is 'to raise someone else's child,' and in some minds, this
definition may still prevail. Yet it mistakenly implies the concept of ownership, and
people cannot own other people, including children." Id. American adoption law
reaches back to Roman law which was governed by the principle adoptio naturam
imitatur ("adoption imitates nature"). Susan L. Brooks, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal
Solution to the Problem of Permanency Planning for Children With Special Needs, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1130, 1135 (1991).
3 See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that "[a] legal adoption
imposes the same rights and responsibilities on an adoptive parent as are imposed on and
assumed by a parent when the child is born to the family"); see also Kelly Bennison,
Note, No Deposit No Return: The Adoption Dilemma, 16 NOVA L. REv. 909 (1992)
(describing adoption as a statutorily created "legal fiction"). The "parent-child relation-
ship" includes all rights, privileges, duties and obligations existing between parent and
child, including inheritance rights. MORTON L. LEAVY, LAW OF ADOPTION 93 (1968).
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parents,4 whereby they achieve the equivalent status of biological
parents. 5
With respect to emotional wellness, every child has a need for
the unbroken continuity of an affectionate and stimulating relationship
with an adult.6 Toward this end, adoption affords a child the oppor-
tunity to live in a stable and loving environment.7 The ultimate goal
of adoption is to provide every child with a situation that is perma-
nent and safe.' Its success is often discussed in terms of parental
satisfaction, child development and the creation of integrated
families.9 The majority of adopting families present a consistent and
happy picture of parents and children defining each other in a
mutually warm, supportive, caring and positive way."1 Unfortu-
nately, however, such an encouraging picture cannot be painted in
every instance." In fact, the most troubling picture, and all to often
4 LEAVY, supra note 3, at 1, 6, 71; see ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 17
(stating that adoption grants social, emotional and legal family membership to the person
who is adopted).
' To avoid any stigma that may be carried by adoptive parents, the term "biological"
parents versus "natural" parents is used throughout this Note because although "many
birth mothers [prefer] the term 'natural mother,' most adoptive parents loathe it,
resenting the implication that their parenting is unnatural." Tamar Lewin, Which Ties
Should Bind? The Strain on the Bonds of Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, § 4,
at 1. The terms "natural family" and "natural parent" are no longer used by adoption
professionals as they are viewed as derogatory toward adoptive parents. See Nancy
Gibbs, The Baby Chase, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 86-87; see also Brenda Hoggett,
Adoption Law: An Overview, in ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL POLICY, LAW, AND
SOCIOLOGY 133 (Philip Bean ed., 1984).
' Gillian Pascall, Adoption: Perspectives in Social Policy, in ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN
SOCIAL POLICY, LAW, AND SOCIOLOGY 13 (Philip Bean ed., 1984).
7 Note, When Love is Not Enough: Toward a Unified Wrongful Adoption Tort, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1761, 1761 (1992) [hereinafter When Love is Not Enough].
" Id. at 1762; see Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in
Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 16 (1975)
(stating that, although there are competing interests in the institution of adoption as we
know it, the principle objective is to provide a secure family environment for children).
9 Pascall, supra note 6, at 10.
'oId. at 11.
"See Dirk Johnson, Case of Boy Abandoned by New Parents Prompts Look at
Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, § 1, at 22. "[M]ost adoptions result in healthy,
loving families. But... some adoptive parents [harbor] unrealistic expectations about
children and [do] not expect problems, which are inevitable." Id. (emphasis added).
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the real one, is when adoptive parents, having had no knowledge that
the child had or would develop physical or emotional disabilities,
seek recourse when those problems do finally manifest themselves. t2
This Note takes the position, for policy and practical reasons,
that avoiding litigation which involves the adopted child 13 is legally
sound and superior to the remedies of annulment14 and wrongful
adoption.15 Part I discusses the inadequacies of the existing system,
which necessarily results in adoptive parents seeking recourse for
damages sustained. Part II discusses the annulment and wrongful
adoption remedies, which should be avoided as alternative remedies
for adoptive parents in light of the "adverse effect theory, "16 as they
do not effectively promote the best interests of the child. Part III
summarizes the concept of the adverse effect theory in relation to the
"best interests of the child" standard. Part IV suggests recommenda-
tions for reform that may prove to be more viable alternatives to
annulment and wrongful adoption in achieving society's paramount
goal-protection of the child.
12 Stephen W. Hayes, Sending Children Back: Efforts to Reverse Adoptions Face
Strong Legal Obstacles, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 88.
13 See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 16-17. The terms "adopted child" or
"adoptive child" are the more acceptable labels and shall be used throughout this Note.
"Adoptee" will not be used because it:
[us considered negative by many adoption professionals because it
defines a person's entire existence around the issue of adoption,
which is only one among many factors affecting an individual. It
may also create the impression of a great degree of differentiation
between "adoptees" and "nonadoptees," even though an adopted
person is the lawful child of adoptive parents with the same rights
and privileges as any child born to them.
Id.
'4 To annul is to make void; to dissolve that which once existed. BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 22 (2d ed. 1984); see Hayes, supra note 12, at 88. In the context of this
Note, "annulment" means adoptive parents return to court to undo the adoption.
"S Wrongful adoption is an action in tort providing a remedy of compensatory
damages to adoptive parents of children who possess a serious physical or emotional
disability, which disability is either later diagnosed, or which latently manifests itself.
Hayes, supra note 12, at 88.
16 In the context of this Note and, specifically, tort litigation, the "adverse effect
theory" is predicated on the notion that "some day the child might be adversely affected
by learning he or she was unwanted ....... Michael C. Pallesen, Note, Wrongful
Pregnancy Actions: Should Courts Allow Recovery for Childrearing Expenses?-Burke
v. Rivo, 406 Mass. 764, 551 N.E.2d 1 (1990), 70 NEB. L. REv. 361, 367 (1991).
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L Inadequacies of the Adoption System
The initial step in any adoption proceeding is the selection of
a child to be adopted.17 Such selection may be arranged through
public placement agencies, whose methods of operation are governed
by state laws and regulations, thereby providing certain benefits and
safeguards 8 to the adoption parties, or by unregulated private
placement agencies. 9 The process appears quite simple on its face.
In practice, however, the adoption system contains serious flaws20 and
adoptive parents are becoming increasingly vulnerable to
mistreatment.2' Such mistreatment is the product of nondisclosure
and fraud, two problems which are most troubling to adoptive
parents.22 With respect to the latter problem, agencies are less than
forthright23 in the pre-placement process and the fraud involved
usually centers on the health or the background24 of the prospective
adoptive child. 25  Generally, fraud in the placement setting is the
exception rather than the rule. 26  However, there has been an
17 LEAVY, supra note 3, at 4.
18 Id.
'9 Private placement adoptions are also an option, but are beyond the scope of this
Note and will not be discussed. For a discussion of private placement adoptions, see
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1481-86
(1992).
20 Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 934 (1991).
21 Id. at 921.
22 In essence, these two concepts co-exist as nondisclosure, or disclosure of incorrect
information, giving rise to fraudulent misrepresentation by the agency. Id. at 922.
' Id. at 937; see Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 103. "Ihere is the additional
problem that in the current competitive search for adoptable infants a reporting agency's
potential conflicting interest may consciously or unconsciously color its report and
detract from the impartiality required to fully inform." Id.
24 See In re Morningstar, 1521 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 1958); Burr v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
' John R. Maley, Wrongfid Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to
Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709,
712 (1987).
6 Id.
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increase27 in instances of fraud in society due to the sharp decline in
the number of available children placed for adoption.28 As a result
of this "baby shortage, 2 9 agencies have attempted to compensate by
facilitating special-needs3" adoptions through a practice of deceiving
the adoptive parents.3
Even more prevalent than misrepresentation is the serious
continuing problem of nondisclosure.32 The disclosure statutes, now
in existence in several states," suffer from a myriad of defects34 and
prevent achieving the goal of greater disclosure of health-related
' Id. As evidence, there are reports of agencies misleading adoptive parents with
the hope of facilitating special needs adoptions. Id.
' Clare Collins, A Shortage of Babies for Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1990, §
CT Weekly, at 1, 6; see Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 13; Tamar Lewin, Fewer
Children UpforAdoption, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at A15 (finding that
the demand for adoptive children exceeds the supply because there has been an increased
acceptance of single parenting, legalization of abortion, and the use of contraception).
29 "Baby shortage" is the term used by professionals in the adoption field to describe
the current problem, which is that the number of people interested in adopting infants
exceeds the number of infants in need of adoption. ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2,
at 51.
30 "Special needs" are conditions and/or characteristics "that make a child difficult
to place by the state adoption unit or an adoption agency." Id. at 266. The conditions
or characteristics may include not only the health or temperament of a child, but also
other characteristics, such as age and race. Id. at 266-67. The phrase "hard to place
children" is now disfavored among adoption professionals, and has been replaced by
"children with special needs." Id. at 143.
31 Maley, supra note 25, at 712; see Mary E. Schwartz, Note, Fraud in the Nursery.:
Is the Wrongful Adoption Remedy Enough?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 807, 824 (1992)
(stating that the reason agencies withhold information is not because they do not trust the
prospective adoptive parents, but because the adoption will probably be blocked if the
adoptive parents knew of some "special need"). However, many couples are willing to,
and even prefer to, adopt special-needs children and agencies should not take it upon
themselves to determine that full disclosure will necessarily discourage certain adoptions.
See Susan Stock, Finding Adoptive Parents for Children With Special Needs, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 8, at 4; Michael T. Kaufman, Finding Miracles, One Child at
a Time, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1993, § 1, at 27; Ralph Blumenthal, Perseverance
Triumphs and a Couple Bring a Child Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1992, at B6.
32 Dickson, supra note 20, at 946-47.
3 For a general listing and discussion of disclosure statutes, see Paula K. Bebensee,
In the Best Interests of Children and Adoptive Parents: The Need for Disclosure, 78
IOWA L. REV. 397, 404 n.65 (1993).
SWhen Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1761.
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information." Such defects include, but are not limited to: (1) failure
to require the furnishing of all information necessary to make an in-
formed decision; 36 (2) failure to articulate a specific standard or duty
of disclosure that agencies must meet;" (3) allowing for too much
agency discretion; 38 (4) providing no real penalty for nonconformity
with statutory guidelines for disclosure of information; 39 (5)
encouraging post-placement disclosure as the rule rather than the
exception;4" and (6) not addressing the difficulty in obtaining accurate
and complete information.41
An additional shortcoming of the existing disclosure laws is
the foreseeability issue.42 Many disorders are difficult to diagnose,
thereby making it increasingly difficult to give an accurate assessment
of a child's condition.43 Furthermore, attempts to predict the impli-
cations of a symptom for an adoptive child's future health creates its
own set of problems because an inaccurate explanation for the
symptom is usually given by the social worker." Moreover, agencies
are overwhelmed by heavy case loads and diminishing funds,
resulting in the uncertainties associated with depending on
3S Similar to fraud, nondisclosure problems also center on the health or background
of prospective adoptive children. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Lifting the Genealogical
Veil: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform of the Disclosure of Health-Related Information
in Adoption, 70 N.C. L. REV. 681, 693 (1992).
1 Dickson, supra note 20, at 950-51. The type of information that should be
disclosed has been the subject of debate. See Bebensee, supra note 33, at 405-06; see
also Schwartz, supra note 31, at 824 (maintaining that information related to an adopted
child's social and medical background should be disclosed). One reason insufficient
information is given to adoptive parents is that adoption agency workers do not reveal
information in a way that can be comprehended. Id.
7 When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1765.
3 Id.; see Schwartz, supra note 31, at 824. An additional reason insufficient
information is given to adoptive parents is the agency's failure to obtain the information
in a systematic and complete manner. Id.
3 When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1765.
' Dickson, supra note 20, at 954.
4' Tracking down records may be time consuming and expensive and birthparents
may provide incomplete or inaccurate information. Id. at 946-47.
42 Id. at 963. To "foresee" implies nothing about how the knowledge is derived and
may apply to ordinary reasoning and experience. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 483 (9th ed. 1985).
' Dickson, supra note 20, at 963.
4Id.
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governmental financial support and with frequent worker burnout and
turnover.45 It is under these oppressive conditions that adoptive
agencies function, or attempt to function. Such internal and external
pressures increase, in part, the frequency of nondisclosure.46
The nondisclosure problem is also exacerbated by the
agencies' failure to view both child and adoptive parents as "clients."
Rather, the agencies regard the latter as merely a "resource" to be
used in meeting agency goals.47 Additionally damaging is the fact
that placement agencies do not perceive nondisclosure and the
misleading of adoptive parents as especially egregious, taking the
position that families, not agencies, are to blame for adoption
disruption.48 Agency apathy, therefore, may be a contributing factor
to the travesty of nondisclosure in the adoption setting. By forcing
adoptive parents to make adoption decisions without requiring
agencies to disclose the complete medical and life histories49 of
prospective adoptive children, the current law fails to adequately
43 WILLIAM FEIGELMAN & ARNOLD R. SILVERMAN, CHOSEN CHILDREN: NEW
PATrERNS OF ADOPTIVE RELATIONSHIPS 31 (1983).
"Dickson, supra note 20, at 946-47.
7 Id. at 948. Some contend that adoptive parents would probably not be willing to
proceed if they were aware of the likelihood of future physical, mental or emotional
problems with the child. Maley, supra note 25, at 714.
"Dickson, supra note 20, at 946-47. "Adoption disruption" describes adoption
placements that end with the return of the child to the agency prior to finalization. Id.
at 945 n.148. "Dissolution" refers to an adoption that fails after finalization. ADAMEC
& PIERCE, supra note 2, at 98-99. However, sometimes the terms "dissolution" and
"disruption" are used interchangeably. Id. But the definition of "disrupt" is to throw
into disorder; to interrupt the normal course or unity of something. WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 366 (9th ed. 1985). Therefore, "adoption disruption"
is a term that could encompass that effect on the child resulting from a post-adoption
proceeding; not just the return of the child, but the "disruption" caused by litigation
which involves the child as a participant and which centers on the child's disability.
'9 See generally Bebensee, supra note 33, at 405-06 (comparing disclosure statutes
of various states). Examples of information that should be disclosed are: records of the
adopted child's medical examinations; physical characteristics of the biological parents;
a gynecological and obstetric history of the biological family; occurrence of drug or
alcohol use during pregnancy; and information concerning the child's physical and
mental condition. Id. at 406. Additional types of information include information
pertaining to the biological parents' education, religion, nationality, occupation, talents,
hobbies, other children, relationship of the biological parents and reasons for placing the
child for adoption. Id.
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safeguard the rights of adopting parents.5" This ultimately affects the
child, who becomes part of a post-placement proceeding as the
adoptive parents seek recourse for a violation of his or her rights.51
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the existing disclosure
laws, they are a significant step in the right direction.52 The benefits
of disclosure laws are twofold: (1) they impose a duty of disclosure,
whereby failure to uphold such a duty would facilitate a wrongful
adoption or other suit;53 and (2) they make disclosure aspirational. s
Nondisclosure, therefore, should be actionable if a duty to disclose
exists. The central issue, then, is whether in a particular case such
a duty arises in connection with the placement of a prospective
adoptive child.55
The question of whether a disclosure duty exists has been
discussed in the context of "a degree of trust and confidence."56 If
it appears from the facts and circumstances that the parties have a
trust and confidence in one another, then a duty to disclose is recog-
nized.57 In cases such as Burr v. Board of County Commissoners,58
Mo When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1761.
SI See infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
52 Dickson, supra note 20, at 955.
5 Id. This Note will only discuss the options of annulment and wrongful adoption.
The other possible alternatives, breach of contract and substantive due process claims
against an agency, are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed. For
cases discussing these types of claims, see Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding that adoptive parents could not proceed on a due process claim); Young
v. Francis, 820 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that adoptive parents could not
maintain constitutional claims for interference with their right to family association
because they lacked standing due to the fact that the adoption was never completed);
Collier v. Krane, 763 F. Supp. 473 (D. Colo 1991) (deciding that an adoptive mother
could not proceed on a § 1983 civil rights action after alleging that misrepresentations
that the adopted child "came from good physical and mental stock" violated her
constitutional rights); Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Ohio 1990) (stating that
one of three claims by adoptive parents was a breach of contract claim); Petrowsky v.
Family Serv., 518 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. App 1987) (recognizing a cause of action for breach
of an adoption contract in the private adoption setting).
Dickson, supra note 20, at 955.
5 Maley, supra note 25, at 723.
5 Bennison, supra note 3, at 928.
5 See Michele Schiffer, Comment, Torts: Fraud in the Adoption Setting, 29 ARIZ.
L. REv. 707, 712-13 (1987) An example of when the parties have trust and confidence
in one another is when there exists a confidential or fiducial relationship between the
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there can be little doubt that the adoptive parents placed their trust
and confidence in the placement agency because the agency has
superior knowledge of the child's condition and background.59 Such
information is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the adoptive
parent, 60 and a strong argument exists for imposing a duty to disclose
upon the party placing the child. 6' Therefore, recovery should flow
from such a duty when the party which placed the child failed to
disclose known risks, and injury results.62
Finally, the welfare of the child is the primary consideration
in all adoption proceedings.63 Undeniably, the best interests of the
agency and the adoptive parents. Id. A "fiduciary" is one who stands in a confidential
relation to another such that the other reposes special confidence in the fiduciary's
devotion to his best interests. Id. These fiduciary characteristics are arguably present
in the adoption setting. Id.
" 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
59 An agency has superior knowledge because the child's records are in the
possession and control of the agency, and the records are then sealed by court order
upon entry of a final decree. Bennison, supra note 3, at 928.
' Maley, supra note 25, at 724. Directly attributable to this obstacle is the existing
requirement of sealed records. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney
1993) (stating that an order of adoption and all related documents are to be sealed and
withheld from inspection, except if allowed by a court order issued upon a showing of
good cause); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.17 (Baldwin 1993) (stating that all papers,
books and records pertaining to adoption are subject to inspection only upon consent of
the court); see also Maley, supra note 25, at 720 n.81 (noting that practically every state
provides for making records relating to adoption proceedings secret and available for
inspection only by a court order issued for good cause, such as a need for medical
information or a claim of inheritance). Although the rationale for such nondisclosure
is compelling because it may shield the child from possibly disturbing facts surrounding
his or her birth or parentage,"sealed records have the tendency of allowing material
information about the [adopted child's] condition or background to be kept from the
adoptive parents." Bennison, supra note 3, at 932.
61 See Maley, supra note 25, at 725. "The argument can certainly be made that a
party failing to inform adoptive parents about known risks of a prospective adoptive
placement violates standards to which the orginary [sic] ethical person would conform."
Id.
2 See id. "Allowing recovery in such situations will not make agencies or others
who place children through independent channels the 'guarantors of their placement."'
Id. (quoting Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109). "Adoptive parents will be able to recover only
when they can prove actual fraud or a failure to disclose known material facts." Id.
6 See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. 2d Adoption § 82 (1962). "The welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration in all proceedings involving the adoption of children and the
courts adhere to the view that the welfare of the child is also of paramount consideration
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child would be better served when the adoptive parents are fully
informed of the child's condition and background.' Informed
decision making prevents needless post-placement proceedings, which
by focusing on some physical or mental deficiency, could have a
negative effect on the child.6
Inauspiciously, the potential for fraud and nondisclosure has
become an unfortunate reality in adoption proceedings. s Because the
evils of fraud and nondisclosure will remain a part of American
society for the foreseeable future, it is necessary to analyze the
remedies available to the victims of fraud and nondisclosure, and to
determine which remedy67 best supports the public interest.6 8
in cases involving annulment or vacation of an adoption decree." Id.; see Bodenheimer,
supra note 8, at 86 (discussing Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Serv., 405 U.S. 1051
(1972), which held that the interest of a child in completing an adoption may outweigh
a father's rights).
6' Bennison, supra note 3, at 928.
' See, e.g., Maley, supra note 25, at 733 (discussing how mandatory disclosure of
adoption information would serve the best interest of the child by assuring that the
adoptive parents would be better able to accept any of the child's physical or mental
risks that become realities). Disclosure would also serve adoptive parents, by "allowing
them to prepare for any special needs the child may develop," and adoption agencies,
because "they would not have to fear future wrongful adoption suits." Id. at 733; see
Hayes, supra note 12, at 88. "'[U]nadoption' may be a less realistic option in cases
involving apparently healthy adopted infants who are later found to be afflicted with
serious physical disorders [because] [s]ignificant time may have passed before the illness
is discovered, and it may be too late for the family to consider giving up the adopted
child." Id.
"Maley, supra note 25, at 714. It has been theorized that the potential for fraud
and nondisclosure exists because of certain societal factors, namely, that the substantial
increase in demand to perfect adoptions cannot necessarily be met by the existing supply
of potential adoptive children. Id. at 713.
1 This reference pertains to those remedies of annulment and wrongful adoption
which are now in existence. See infra notes 69-157 and accompanying text. Any other
remedies are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be discussed. For discussions
of other remedies, see generally Maley, supra note 25, at 713-14 (discussing attempts
to codify criminal remedies for adoption fraud and nondisclosure of adoption
information) and Shannon M. Connelly, Note, A Survey of the WrongfulAdoption Cause
of Action and Statutory Remedies for Adoption Fraud, 10 REv. Lrrio. 793, 807-21
(1991) (examining various criminal and civil statutory remedies).
' Maley, supra note 25, at 714.
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IL Current State of Remedies Available
A. Annulment
Adoption is normally a heartwarming experience. Children
are integrated into the adoptive family and, like virtually all familial
relationships, the child becomes dependent on his or her adoptive
parents for maintenance, love and affection.69 However, like
emotional ties, "legal bonds between children and adoptive parents
can also break," and the adoptive parents must return to court in an
attempt to undo the adoption.7 °
Early statutes permitted an adoptive parent to bring an
annulment action71 against the agency which intentionally or
negligently misrepresented, or failed to disclose a child's physical or
emotional disability.7" Under these early statutes, if the annulment
petition was successful,73 the adoptive relationship was rendered void
and the child was returned to the foster care system.74 If the
6 Hayes, supra note 12, at 88.
70 Id.
71 See Bebensee, supra note 33, at 410-12.
' Bennison, supra note 3, at 910. Those states that do allow annulment under these
limited circumstances are the exception rather than the rule. "Most states do not have
statutory provisions that authorize [annulment] of adoption." JUDITH AREEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1595 (3d ed. 1992).
' Judges have vast discretion in this area and "[viery few annulments of adoption
decrees occur." When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1768. "This is because
courts realize that an annulment means abandonment for at least the second time in the
adopted child's life." Id. But see In re Lisa Diane G., 537 A.2d 131 (R.I. 1988)
(finding that the lower court properly exercised its jurisdiction in setting aside the adop-
tion where the adoption agency gave the adoptive parents fraudulent information and
failed to inform them that a mental health institution recommended the child not be
placed for adoption because of behavioral problems).
' Bennison, supra note 3, at 910. Foster care "[glenerally refers to the system set
up to protect children who are.., abandoned or whose parents" have voluntarily chosen
not to fulfill their parenting obligations. ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 126.
Because the term "foster care" encompasses all children in. the system, foster and
adoptive, there is still much confusion as to the difference between an adoptive home
and a foster home. The difference between the two is as follows:
An adoptive family has the same parental rights and obligations as
a birth family does when the child is born to them. A foster family
must defer many decisions about a child's welfare to a state or
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annulment petition was unsuccessful, 7" or if the adoptive parents
chose to take no action upon learning of the physical or emotional
disability, they could keep the child and meet the expenses them-
selves.76
Courts are understandably averse to granting annulments77
because, as a remedy, an annulment is a harsh result. 78  Any
mistreatment perpetrated on the parents will ordinarily not be
discovered until well after family bonding has occurred.79
county social worker. Although a child may remain in a foster home
for years as a foster child, the state can (and has) removed foster
children for a variety of reasons. An adopted child, however, can
only be removed for the same reasons as a birth child.
Id.
75 See In re Adoption of L., 151 A.2d 435 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1959) (refusing
to set aside an adoption despite the contrary desire of all parties, including the biological
parents, because, according to the court, that the child's best interests would be better
served in the adoptive home, and a mere change in attitude or regret does not constitute
proper grounds for annulments); In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 N.E.2d 281 (Mass.
1966) (refusing to set aside an adoption of seven years merely because adoptive parents
were having difficulty disciplining the child).
76 Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause ofAction,
27 J. FAM. L. 475, 476 (1988-89).
' When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1761. Complete abandonment of the
child is the result of granting an annulment petition. Elizabeth N. Carroll, Abrogation
of Adoption by Adoptive Parents, 19 FAM L. Q. 155, 159 (1985). Additionally, the
intent behind a final adoption order is that "the familial relationship becomes natural and
final"; to grant an annulment would contravene that intent. Anne Harlan Howard,
Annulment of Adoption Decrees on Petition ofAdoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549, 558
(1985).
7 Bennison, supra note 3, at 911. "[T he child would lose all rights with regard to
the adoptive parents. The child would be removed from his or her home and would be
without the care and nurturing all children need . . . . The outcome for such children
is grim." Carroll, supra note 77, at 176. For a heartbreaking plea of a child to his
adoptive parents, who wished to void the adoption, thereby returning the child to the
system and separating him from his brother, see Johnson, supra note 11, § 1, at 22
("I'm very sorry and I hope to get to see you again .... I just want to say I miss
you.").
79 ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 71. Bonding and attachment refers to:
mhe mutual affectionate connection that is cemented between a
child and a parent, whether the child is a biological child or an
adopted child. The process of establishing this connection includes
a growing feeling of entitlement to family life, love, responsibility
and a variety of other emotions normally experienced by a parent
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Consequently, to sever such a bond and grant an annulment of the
adoption harms the family unit and the child, which is contrary to the
child's best interests."0
The recent trend in state legislatures is to not make a
provision for annulment of an adoption.81 This is a result of the
policy of fostering stability in family relationships and the emphasis
on children's welfare.82 Alternatively, even if a state has provided
for the statutory remedy of annulment,83 most jurisdictions are still
hesitant to grant an annulment of a completed adoption. 84
The overall consensus seems to be that "[p]arents should
never be permitted to return a child once they have established a legal
parent-child relationship and the child has become part of the
family."85 There also appears to be a consesus that "[s]ince the
and child.
Id. Some adoption experts differentiate between the two terms and believe "bonding"
can only occur between child and biological parent, while "attachment" occurs between
child and adoptive parent. See Lois RUSKAI MELINA, RAISING ADOPTED CHILDREN: A
MANUAL FOR ADOPTIVE PARENTS 39 (1986).
8o Bennison, supra note 3, at 919; see Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 83 (stating that
securing finality of adoptions is a paramount goal). Adoptions "'should assume the
characteristics of permanence as early as possible' and ...an adoption decree once
rendered should be 'final and the child secure in a permanent family relationship. '" Id.
(quoting SANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 131 (1971)).
SI Maley, supra note 25, at 715.
8 See Pierce v. Pierce, 522 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1975).
83 Availability of annulment to an adoptive parent is severely limited by statute in the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. Maley, supra note 25, at 715. Five states
(Alaska, Arkansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Ohio) have even adopted the
relatively strict provision of the Uniform Adoption Act. AREEN, supra note 72, at 1595;
see infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Uniform Adoption Act).
84 As with any subject of debate, there are exceptions to every rule, California being
perhaps the most egregious example, having annulled 69 adoptions between 1983 and
1987. Dickson, supra note 20, at 946. Similarly, in 1990, a Florida court dealt with
the issue of annulment and, after finding a fraud had been perpetrated on the parents,
permitted annulment of the adoption. M.L.B. v. Department of Health and Rehab.
Services, 559 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). But see Prime News: Florida Court
Accepts Couple's Request to Give Up Kids [hereinafter Prime News] (CNN television
broadcast, Oct. 16, 1992) (noting that failed adoptions are uncommon-only 11 in
Florida since 1989).
85 Bennison, supra note 3, at 915; see Maley, supra note 25, at 709 (stating that one
of the primary reasons annulments are disfavored is that they break up the newly created
family unit and force the child once again to undergo a dramatic change in environment).
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adoptive relationship was initially found to promote the child's best
interests, this relationship should not be ended simply because the
parents have changed their minds. "86 Even if fraud is found, severing
the parent-child tie is not in the best interests of the child and an
annulment should not be granted.8 7
Case law concerning annulment is illustrative of such
unanimity of sentiment. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court,
in In re Leach,88 a petition for annulment which was based on fraud.89
The court found the fraud committed on the adoptive parents by the
agency, with respect to the alleged nondisclosure of an underlying
mental illness, insufficient to sever an eleven year relationship.9"
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court, in McDuffee v. Rehm,91
stated that "in the absence of some compelling reason," an adoption
should never be annulled where the child's family unit would be
severed and the child would become a public charge.92
Cases opposing annulment of adoption93 make it apparent that
downfalls exists when annulments are granted as a remedy.' These
include the inherent lack of deterrent value against future fraud and
nondisclosure.95 More importantly, annulments have a harsh effect
86 Bennison, supra note 3, at 918; see Johnson, supra note 11, § 1, at 22 (quoting
David S. Liederman, executive director of the Child Welfare League of America, as
follows: "'This is not like going to the 5- and 10-cent store, where you can return
something if you decide you don't like it."'). Although as a remnant of "ancient" adop-
tion, it may have been appropriate to provide for the return of a "defective child" like
substandard merchandise not up to specifications or the seller's warranty, such action is
inconsistent with the modern emphasis on the best interests of the child. Bodenheimer,
supra note 8, at 84.
8 Bennison, supra note 3, at 915.
8 128 N.W.2d 475 (Mich. 1964).
I ld. at 476.
90 id. at 477.
"' 352 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961).
92 Id. at 27.
9' See, e.g., Allen v. Allen, 330 P.2d 151 (Or. 1958); In re Adoption of L., 151
A.2d 435 (N.J. Super. 1959); In re Anonymous, 213 N.Y.S.2d 10 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1961); In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 N.E.2d 281 (Mass. 1966).
Maley, supra note 25, at 718.
9 It is unlikely that any fraud or mistreatment perpetrated on the parents will be
discovered before bonding has occurred. Bennison, supra note 3, at 919. As such,
"annulment will have only a limited effect upon those who perpetrated the fraud." Id.
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on the child.96 Understandably, "judges who are sympathetic to the
plight of the unwanted child often refuse to grant this extreme reme-
dy. ''97 In light of these downfalls, serious consideration and
evaluation should be given to an alternative remedy now in
existence-the tort of wrongful adoption.9"
B. Wrongful Adoption-The Current State of Wrongful Adoption
Tort Rationale and its Continued Development
While annulment of adoptions is unlikely in most cases,99 an
emerging trend, with the potential to benefit adoptive parents, is the
establishment of the new tort of wrongful adoption.'00 Wrongful
adoption is a preferable remedy that provides compensatory
damages l"' to adoptive parents of children who are later diagnosed as
having serious physical or emotional disabilities. 2
There seems to be a general agreement that if an adoption
agency engages in a practice of fraud, whether in the form of
fraudulently withholding or intentionally concealing information about
an adoptive child, "common sense and basic fairness dictate that the
interest of the adoptive parents should be given some weight in
resolving the dispute. "103 Yet, the tort of wrongful adoption
represents a relatively unprecedented phenomenon. In fact, wrongful
adoption was virtually unheard of prior to 1980, when California
Maley, supra note 25, at 718; see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 1766.
9 Maley, supra note 25, at 718.
99 Hayes, supra note 12, at 88.
100 Dickson, supra note 20, at 922.
101 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 832-33 (discussing what types of damages should
be recoverable by wrongful-adoption plaintiffs). Consequential damages and
extraordinary medical expenses, including future medical expenses, should be
recoverable; routine expenses of raising a child should not. Id. at 832. Damages for
emotional distress have also been the subject of debate; opponents believe that despite
the "special needs" of the child, the adoptive parent has benefitted from the parenting
experience. Id. Additionally, to allow recovery for parents' emotional distress would
not further the interests of the child. Id.
12 Hayes, supra note 12, at 88.
11 Dickson, supra note 20, at 922.
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became the first state called upon to consider the interests of the
adoptive child in the context of this tort theory. 1" Although the
California Court of Appeals, in Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child
Care Services,"'5 did not allow the adoptive parents to recover, the
court's decision framed the issues that have arisen in all subsequent
wrongful adoption actions. 10 6  These subsequent actions have
confirmed that the tort of wrongful adoption raises the issues of: (1)
intentional misrepresentation; (2) fraudulent concealment; or (3)
negligent misrepresentation.
1. Intentional Misrepresentation0 7
In 1986, the first reported successful case of wrongful
adoption occurred in Burr v. Board of County Commissoners. °s
Basing its decision on the elements of fraud,0 9 the Ohio Supreme
" See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 825 (stating that Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar
Child Care Services, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) was the "first case that
alleged what later became known as wrongful adoption.").
'o5 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
1'0 See id.
107 For a general discussion of the cases involving intentional misrepresentation, see
Connelly, supra note 67, at 803.
"' 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). This case involved adoptive parents who brought
a civil action after their child, Patrick, was diagnosed as suffering from Huntington's
Disease, a genetically-inherited disorder which destroys the central nervous system. Id.
at 1103. The Burrs' success followed from the opening of the child's sealed records
which revealed that Patrick's family background and medical profile made him at risk
for the disease. Id. at 1103-04; see Meraclev. Children's Serv. Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532
(Wis. 1989) (allowing recovery by adoptive parents in their wrongful adoption lawsuit).
Meracle also involved a child diagnosed with Huntington's Disease and an agency that
assured the adoptive parents that the child was not at risk of contracting the disease. Id.
at 533.
109 The Burr court restated the elements of fraud as they were enumerated in
Friedland v. Lipman, 429 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980):
(a) a representation, or, where there is a duty to disclose, a conceal-
ment of, a fact;
(b) which is material to the transaction at hand;
(c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter
disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that
knowledge may be inferred;
(d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it;
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Court found an adoption agency liable for an intentional, material
misrepresentation of a child's background and physical condition, and
affirmed an award of money damages11 for fraudulent inducement of
adoption via a deliberate misrepresentation of the child's health.111
After Burr, other jurisdictions followed the reasoning of the
Ohio Supreme Court and allowed such a tort action to proceed."' In
Meracle v. Children's Service Society," 3 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed recovery by adoptive parents, who brought a wrongful
adoption lawsuit." 4 As in Burr, this case involved a child diagnosed
with Huntington's Disease and an agency that assured the adoptive
(e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment; and
(f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.
Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1105.
110 A jury awarded the Burrs $125,000 for medical and emotional damages. Id. at
1108. Although the decision was appealed, the award was affirmed by both the Franklin
County Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court. Id.
.. Id. at 1109. "Fraud in the inducement" is fraud:
"[Clonnected with [an] underlying transaction and not with the nature
of the contract or document signed. Misrepresentation as to the
terms, quality or other aspects of a contractual relation, venture or
other transaction that leads a person to agree to enter into the
transaction with a false impression or understanding of the risks,
duties or obligations she has undertaken."
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 661 (6th ed. 1990).
"(112 Apparently, seven states have recognized or will recognize the claims of adoptive
parents in the agency setting to sue in tort for wrongful adoption: Ohio (Burr v. Board
of County Commissioners, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986)); Allen v. Children's Services,
567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)); California (Michael J. v. Los Angeles County
Department of Adoptions, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859 (1988)); Wisconsin (Meracle v.
Children's Services Soc'y, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989)); Iowa (Engstrom v. State, 461
N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1990)); Minnesota (M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 488 N.W.2d
282 (Minn. 1992)); Illinois (Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. Ct. App.
1992)); and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Texas law (Griffith v. Johnston,
899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990)). In Griffith, although the court rejected the parents' due
process claim, its opinion seems to suggest that the parents would have successfully
recovered damages had they proceeded on a tort claim. Id. Florida has allowed for
recovery in tort for wrongful adoption in the private adoption setting and, thus, may be
considered the eighth state to allow recovry under this theory. See Wallerstein v.
Hospital Corp., 573 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
113 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989).
n4 The Wisconsin Supreme Court awarded medical damages, but denied damages
for emotional distress. Id. at 536-37.
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parents that the child was not at risk of contracting the disease. 5
The court found that the adoption agency had assumed a duty to
inform the adoptive parents about the health of the child." 6
However, by misrepresenting the facts, the agency breached this
duty. 117 Thus, the parents were allowed to proceed on their wrongful
adoption claim."'
The agencies in Burr and Meracle voluntarily assumed a duty
to disclose, and their liability centered around a misrepresentation of
facts, rather than an omission.119 Wrongful adoption actions in other
jurisdictions, however, have centered not only on the basis of
omission rather than commission, but on public policy arguments
which focus on fairness and justice. 2 ' These arguments differ
somewhat from the assumption of duty to disclose arguments present
in the aforementioned cases and usually arise in fraudulent
concealment actions.
2. Fraudulent Concealment121
Michael J. v. Los Angeles Department of Adoptions, 22 in-
volved an adoptive mother who brought an action against the county
after her adoptive child was diagnosed as suffering from Sturge-
Weber Syndrome.1 23 The California Supreme Court, following the
15 Id. at 533.
116 Id. at 537.
117 Id.
"s Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537.
119 See, e.g., id.; 491 N.E.2d at 1108.
'2o See, e.g., Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 981 (Miss. 1990) (holding that public
policy demands that adoption agencies not be guarantors of children's placements);
Michael J. v. Los Angeles Dep't of Adoptions, 201 Cal. App. 3d 859 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that a cause of action exists against adoption agencies for intentional
misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment because "[a]s trustees of the child's destiny
the [adoption] agency was obligated to act with morals greater than those found in a
purveyor's common marketplace"); see also Deborah L. Miller, Are You Adopting a
Child or a Heartache? Adoption Agencies May Have to Disclose or Face a Claim for
Wrongful Adoption, 26 NEw ENo. L. REv. 1145, 1153-54 (1992).
"I See Connelly, supra note 67, at 804.
'2 201 Cal. App. 3d 859 (1988).
'z Id. at 893.
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reasoning set forth in Burr, stated that a cause of action exists against
a county adoption agency for fraudulent concealment in the adoption
process.1 24 Recovery was directly attributable to the actions of the
agency which intentionally concealed and denied that the "port wine
stain on the child's upper torso and face was a manifestation of
Sturge-Weber Syndrome." 125 Rejecting the agency's argument, the
court held that public policy considerations do not require that an
adoption agency be immune from liability in such instances where the
health of a prospective adoptive child is the issue.126 However, this
opinion is limited in that the court did state that recovery by the
adoptive parents would be barred if the action was based on negli-
gence of the agency, rather than on intentional misrepresentation or
fraudulent concealment. 127
3. Negligent Misrepresentation
Contrary to the opinions of Michael J. and Meracle, public
policy concerns were influential in the resolution of a number of
opinions, which held that no cause of action should be recognized for
negligence in tort as it pertains to wrongful adoption. 128
124 Id. at 874-75.
12 Id. at 875 (stating that the parents were repeatedly assured by the agency that the
port wine stain was merely a birthmark).
"2 Id. (stating that "[p]ublic policy cannot extend to condone concealment or
intentional misrepresentation which misleads prospective adoptive parents"). Similarly,
in Meracle, the court rejected the agency's public policy argument. 437 N.W.2d at 874-
75.
'"Michael J., 201 Cal. App. 3d at 874-75.
' LeMay, supra note 76, at 480. But see M.H. v. Caritas Family Services, 475
N.W.2d 94, 100 (Minn. App. 1991) (holding that a cause of action in negligent mis-
representation against an adoption agency does not offend public policy). Thus, courts
vary on public policy grounds and the future possibility of parents proceeding on a wider
range of tort theories is apparent. See, e.g., Roe v. Catholic Charities, 588 N.E.2d 354
(Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that parents could recover for both negligent misrepresenta-
tion and fraud). The Catholic Charities court found the agency owed a duty to
prospective parents to give an honest and complete response to their specific request
concerning the characteristics of the child and that the agency breached its duty by
failing to supply the parents with the requested information. Id. at 364-65.
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In Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar OdI Care Serices, " the California
Court of Appeals held that a suit against an adoption agency for
negligence in providing information about an adopted child was
barred on public policy grounds. 3 ' The court reasoned that justice
and fairness warranted no recovery because the agency had disclosed
all pertinent medical information and the adoptive parents had
performed their own inquiry regarding the health of the child prior
to placement. 3' In 1990, three courts reached a similar result. 13 2
In Engstrom v. State,' adoptive parents alleged that an
agency was negligent in their child's placement. 13 4  The parents
argued that the agency had two duties-the statutory duty to properly
terminate the biological parents' rights,'35 and the duty to properly
investigate the child's background.' 36 Consequently, the primary
issue was whether the social worker had a duty to fully investigate
the child's background.137 Not surprisingly, the court was reluctant
to imply a legal duty of care in the adoption setting without an
express mandate from the legislature.'38 Addressing the public policy
considerations, the court held that an agency should incur no liability
absent fraud, willful intent to harm or personal injury to the parties
to the adoption.'39
129 165 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App.1980).
130 Id. at 373.
13 After receiving a copy of the neurological report, the parents consulted a
pediatrician who conducted his own tests and found the child to be in good health. Id.
at 372-73.
132 Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1990); Allen v. Children's Services,
567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990).
133 461 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1990). In 1981, the Engstroms received a child from a
state agency for the purpose of pre-adoption placement. Id. at 312. The couple was
informed that the child's mother was in a women's reformatory and that the child's
father was deceased. Id. However, five years after they took the child into their home,
the biological father appeared and asserted his parental rights. Id.
4 Id. at 314.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
13" Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 314.
139 Id. at 316.
1994] ADOPTION 403
In Allen v. Children's Services, 141 parents brought an action
against an agency alleging, in part, negligence, after their adopted
child suffered a profound hearing loss. 141 The court did not entertain
the parents' negligence claim and tried the case solely on the breach
of contract theory. 142 The court held that adoption agreements are not
contracts of insurance, and that only intentional misrepresentions
should lead to compensable injuries. 141
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Foster v. Bass,'" has also
refused to allow recovery, absent a showing of fraudulent
concealment of material facts. 145  The Foster court held that the
agency was not negligent for failing to test the child.' 46 Specifically,
the court did not find that the agency owed a duty to the parents
because the harm was not foreseeable and the agency did not conceal
any information from the parents. 147  Thus, the court's decision
implies a public policy consideration limiting agency liability.148
These cases clearly illustrate the principle that "recognition of
the wrongful adoption theory will not serve to make those placing
'40 567 N.E.2d 1346 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
141 Id. at 1348.
142 Id. at 1349.
143 Id. (citing Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109).
144 575 So. 2d 967 (Miss. 1990).
145Id. Adoptive parents brought suit against the adoption agency and two physicians
alleging negligence in the placement of their adopted son, Geoffrey. Id. at 968. They
claimed that the agency was negligent in failing to have the child tested for
phenylketonuria, a very rare, recessive, genetic disorder which causes phenylalanine to
accumulate in the blood, causing brain damage and requiring special treatment for the
remainder of the child's life. Id. at 968-70.
146 Id. at 982.
147 Id. at 975-76.
14 Unless the agency undertakes to have the child examined by a doctor or
supervises the medical treatment, an agency will not be liable for failing to diagnose, but
only for its fraudulent concealment of material facts. Foster, 575 So. 2d at 981-83; see
Allen v. Children's Servs., 567 N.E.2d 1346, 1347 (Ohio 1990) (finding that the agency
made no express promise to investigate the child's health or background, that all parties
thought the child was healthy, and that the child had been medically examined prior to
placement).
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children guarantors of their placements. "49  They also support the
idea that "Ulust as there are risks and benefits inherent in becoming
[biological] parents; so too are there risks and benefits present in the
adoption process."' 5
By way of commentary, proponents of the wrongful adoption
theory contend that adoptive parents should be allowed to recover
damages in tort which are commensurate with the child's medical
expenses.' The remedy of wrongful adoption is far superior and
preferable to annulment of adoption because "it keeps the child within
the family unit while compensating the adoptive parents for damages
incurred. "152
To reiterate, the best interest of the child is the paramount
consideration in any adoption proceeding.' 53 Persuasive arguments
can be, and have been, made contending that wrongful adoption is the
lesser of the two evils.' 54 However, it is possible that such post-
placement proceedings will cause the child to experience rejection,
"'s Richard P., 106 Cal. App. 3d at 860; Allen, 567 N.E;2d at 1348 (stating that the
defendant was not the guarantor of the health of the child); see Schwartz, supra note 31,
at 826 (stating that it would be unreasonable to make an agency the guarantor of the
child's future good health as this guarantee is also unavailable to biological parents).
150 Maley, supra note 25, at 726; see Johnson, supra note 11, § 1, at 22 (quoting
Patrick Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian, regarding the unrealistic expectations
of adoptive families, as follows: "They expect some TV sitcom family. Instead, the
got a kid who marches to his own drummer. But it's not like he was swinging from the
chandeliers. He's a normal kid who got into the kind of mischief you'd expect of an 11-
year old boy.").
151 Bennison, supra note 3, at 931; see Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537; Burr, 491
N.E.2d at 1108; Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. All of the plaintiffs in these cases
were allowed to pursue an action for extraordinary medical expenses incurred. See
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 832-33 (stating that to allow "recovery for . . . parents'
emotional distress would not further the interests of the child" and damages should be
restricted to extraordinary, unusual expenses).
12 Bennison, supra note 3, at 931. Parents who commence wrongful adoption
actions are seeking neither to annul an adoption nor to sever their ties with the child;
they merely seek compensation for the expenses involved in caring for a child with
physical and/or mental problems. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 808.
"5 Maley, supra note 25, at 715 n.44.
"4 The second evil being annulment of adoption. See Fred S. Wilson, Wrongful
Adoption: A Guide to Impending Tort Litigation in Texas, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 273
(1992).
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doubt and instability. 155 Therefore, wrongful adoption litigation may
conflict with the judicial and social policy of promoting the best
interests of the child.
While fairness and sound public policy may support a cause
of action for wrongful adoption in limited circumstances, the
extension of tort law to this form of misrepresentation or fraudulent
concealment does not go far enough in protecting the adoptive child's
interests. There are no clear guidelines as to when agencies must
disclose medical history and/or risks relating to the adoptive child. 156
And, while wrongful adoption actions may provide a remedy for an
injury that the child and the adoptive parents have suffered, such
actions do little to prevent the situation from re-occurring.157
III. Best Interests of the Child
When a society recognizes the personhood of its
smallest and most vulnerable members and not only
protects them but does so in a manner that promotes
their dignity, it sets a tone conducive to promotion of
democratic ideals. When such conditions are not
present, the message is clear that raw power is more
important than either reason or caring. 5
Just as the nation's first adoption statute 159 made the welfare
of the child its primary concern 60 modern adoption laws also make
the best interests of the child the paramount goal of the adoption pro-
15 Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass 1990).
1 Wilson, supra note 154, at 277 n.23.
157 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 837-38.
158 Melton, supra note 1, at 531 (emphasis added).
159 See Wilson, supra note 154, at 277 n.23 (stating that although Mississippi
provided for adoption as early as 1846, the Massachusetts statute, enacted in 1851, was
much more comprehensive and actually pioneered adoption law).
160 See id.
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cess.161 Although, in theory, the standard is encouraging, deciding
what really is in the best interests of the child is a basic question, yet
unanswered. 162
It has been noted that an experience that causes a child to
endure rejection, doubt and instability conflicts with the court's policy
of promoting the best interests of the child.163 Therefore, even
though recovery in a wrongful adoption suit, unlike annulment, does
not sever the family unit, litigation involving the adoptive child,
which focuses on the child's defect, is sufficiently likely to have an
effect which is contrary to the child's best interests.164
Purely economic factors should not be the primary
consideration in the post-placement adoption setting. 165 Rather, courts
need to use information from the child development field to evaluate
a child's physical, mental and emotional needs. 66 As a policy
matter, justice dictates that adoptive parents, like any other tort
victim, should be entitled to some form of compensatory damages in
cases of fraud or nondisclosure. 167 However, more viable alternatives
should be sought16 which would avoid subjecting the child to
161 Dickson, supra note 20, at 924; see Schwartz, supra note 31, at 813-14. The
modem American adoption system illustrates a significant shift in adoption policy. By
incorporating the best interests of the child standard, the law reflects a societal
preference for serving and protecting children rather than adoptive parents. Id.
"62 The best interest standard is hard to define, and its vagueness has led to confusion
and divisiveness in the child welfare field. Gary N. Skoloff, Family Law Section Seeks
to Educate, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6, 1990, at 25.
16 JOHN DE WrmT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 149 (1993)
("[C]ases make it clear that conduct that is harmful to the child ... will be weighed in
the determination of what constitutes the child's best interests.") The best interests
standard is the judicial standard utilized in the majority of adoption proceedings.
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 814.
164 "Children 'respond to any threat to their emotional security with fantastic
anxieties ... distortion of reality ... displacement of feelings-reactions which are no
help for coping, but rather put [the child] at the mercy of events."' Carroll, supra note
77, at 174 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 12 (1979)).
165 Schwartz, supra note 31, at 813.
166 Courts cannot neglect non-economic facts that contribute heavily to a child's
psychological growth and development. Id.
167 See id. at 831-33.
16 "While it is true that adoptive parents have legal rights and privileges, these
should be subordinate to those of the child .... " Carroll, supra note 77, at 174-75.
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litigation.169 As a practical matter, wrongful adoption is often viewed
as a superior remedy to annulment, as no severance of family ties
results, and the child remains a part of an established family.1 71
Despite this apparent advantage of wrongful adoption over annulment,
it does not necessarily follow that no decay or destruction of the
family unit, via the child, has occurred. In fact, in light of recent
wrongful birth cases, 71 to which the emerging wrongful adoption tort
has been analogized, 1 2 one conceivable disadvantage in wrongful
adoption litigation is the possible adverse psychological effect 73 that
may result when the child learns that he or she was the subject of a
lawsuit. 74 Hence, one theory which the court should consider in
"6 "Continuity and stability . . . are assumed to be important and desirable for
children . . . . But a substantial and impressive consensus exists among psychologists
and psychiatrists that disruption of the parent-child relationship carries significant risks."
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 265 (1975). Although this statement
was made in the context of child custody, this Note contends that litigation is
"disruptive;" therefore, this same theme also pervades wrongful adoption litigation which
not only involves the child, but in which the child is the focus.
170 Maley, supra note 25, at 730; see Schwartz, supra note 31, at 808.
17' E.g., Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990) (holding that a physician's
liability for unsuccessfully performing a sterilization procedure includes cost of raising
the child to adulthood); McKeanan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984) (holding that
physician was not liable for unsuccessful sterilization procedure because it was
impossible to ascertain whether parents were damaged); University of Arizona v.
Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983) (holding that cost of raising a child is
compensable in a wrongful pregnancy action); Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718
(Ala. 1982) (holding that physician's liability for failing to remove a patient's fallopian
tubes included damages for physical pain and suffering the patient experienced as a result
of her pregnancy). "Wrongful birth" is an action in tort, sounding in negligence,
brought by the parents of an infant born with genetic defects or other abnormalities.
Michael H. Knight, Johnson v. University Hospitals of Cleveland: A Misapplied Public
Policy, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 153, 154 (1990).
' Maley, supra note 25, at 730.
'v This has been the concern raised in wrongful birth cases and analogies can and
should be made to wrongful adoption as wrongful adoption is a new and developing area
of tort and family law. Maley, supra note 25, at 730. "[Family law, also called
domestic relations law, involves the legal relationships between ... parent and child as
a social, political and economic unit." See GREGORY, supra note 163, at 1.
174 See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (denying the parents'
wrongful adoption request because of the psychological effect on the child).
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evaluating whether a wrongful adoption action should proceed is "the
adverse effect on the child" theory.175
In wrongful birth cases, the "fear of an adverse effect on the
child is predicated on the tenuous assumption that the child is in fact
[the] 'damage'"1'76 In opposition, proponents of parental recovery in
wrongful birth cases have argued to the contrary, contending that the
child itself is not the "damage." '77  Rather, it is the reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the negligence-the cost of raising the
child-that is the damage.' 78  However plausible this argument
appears in the wrongful birth context, this same distinction cannot be
made within the framework of wrongful adoption cases.
Adoptive parents commence a wrongful adoption action and
seek to recover money damages because they contend the child is in
fact "damaged" or "defective.""'7 Accordingly, the foreseeable
consequence of the agency's misrepresentation, concealment or
negligence, is not the cost of raising the child, 8' but is either the
physical, mental, emotional or developmental disability that the
agency failed to fully disclose, and thus, the focus in wrongful
adoption litigation is the disability of the child. 1 ' This is not a nebu-
171 Pallesen, supra note 16, at 363-64, 367. This theory is discussed in the context
of wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy actions, but similarities between such a tort
action and the tort of wrongful adoption have been recognized and it is this Note's
contention that an "adverse effect on the child" theory can also be readily equated in the
wrongful adoption context. ""1
'76 Id. at 368. It "'is not an aspersion upon the value of the child's life . . . [but]
is instead a recognition of the importance of the parents' fundamental right to control
their reproductivity."' Id. (quoting Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 425 N.E.2d 968,970 (IU.
App. Ct. 1981)).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986); Richard
P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 106 Cal. App. 3d 860 (1980).
' This is not meant to suggest that the cost of raising the child is not a component
of the wrongful adoption suit but, unlike wrongful birth, it is not a basis of the claim
itself. Rather, it is a key factor that determines, in part, the amount of damages, if any.
See generally Maley, supra note 25, at 727-29 (discussing the appropriate measure of
damages for wrongful birth claims versus wrongful adoption claims).
181 Precedent-setting case law in the wrongful adoption arena has involved parents'
entitlement to sue due to the fact that the child has been diagnosed as suffering from
some disability or disease. See generally id. at 718-21 (discussing Burr, where the
agency misrepresented that the child was a "nice, big, healthy baby boy" when in fact
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lous assumption, and it is this focus upon which the fear of an
adverse effect is predicated.182
The adverse effect theory has led some courts to deny
recovery in wrongful birth cases,183 and consequently, commentators
have stated that the adverse effect theory merits attention in wrongful
adoption.' Opponents of disallowing recovery by adoptive parents
have stated that "some day the child might be adversely affected by
learning he or she [was unwanted] and that someone else paid his or
her rearing expenses."185 Those opposed to a court invoking this
theory to deny recovery by adoptive parents state that wrongful
adoption is the preferable alternative' 86 and this theory should not act
as a complete bar to recovery. 187
Once again, cogent arguments have been made for wrongful
adoption as a superior remedy to annulment. However, as a matter
of public policy, one does not want to give adoptive parents the
"green light" to return their child, or to collect money for their child
whenever they become dissatisfied, because above all, one must keep
in mind the child's mental and emotional health.' Also, as a matter
of public policy, "a child should not be treated as a piece of defective
merchandise, returnable by the adoptive parents if not worthy of the
he suffered from physical and mental problems).
182 See Dickson, supra note 20, at 924 (discussing the best interest of the child
approach in adoption proceedings).
1s3 Maley, supra note 25, at 730 (citing Boonev. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala.
1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 628 S.W.2d 568 (Ark. 1982)).
'" Maley, supra note 25, at 730.
185 Pallesen, supra note 16, at 366-67; see Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 19-20
(stating that to assume children can adapt to change with greater ease than adults may
be misguided and heeding the advice of professionals in the field of psychology may be
warranted). "[C]hildren are more emotionally delicate than adults ... and more apt to
be damaged, sometimes permanently, when uprooted from a secure environment ...
and they 'lack a sense of future' which prevents them from seeing beyond a current
catastrophe." Id.
"86 "The adopted child would seem to be better off with her adoptive parents, even
where she learns of the action, than if she were to be uprooted from her only family; in
fact, the knowledge that her parents chose to seek monetary damages rather than annul-
ment may serve to cement her relationship to the family." Maley, supra note 25, at 730
n.141.
17 Id. at 730.
'8 Bennison, supra note 3, at 915.
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price paid."" 9 The paramount consideration-the best interests of the
child-should not be discarded at any point along the adoption
continuum to the advantage of adoptive parents if only done so in
response to their whim of dissatisfaction. Even if there comes a point
when the court decides an adoptive parent has been the victim of
fraud or misrepresentation, the proper avenue of recourse for the
parent should be determined in conjunction with society's primary
consideration of what is best for the child.
The main impact of the findings of child psychology on the
described developments in adoption law relate to the problem of the
child being the subject of wrongful adoption litigation.'
Specifically, litigation which focuses on the child's defect or disability
as alleged by the adoptive parent is the evil'91 to be avoided, and
should be replaced with a more workable option.' 92 If the child's
interest is to be recognized as paramount, there should be several
changes in the law.
"' Id. at 918-19; see Dirk Johnson, Debate on Adoption is Focusing on Rights to See
Family Histories, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, § 1, at 36 (quoting William Pierce,
president of the National Committee for Adoption, as follows: "[W]e cannot warranty
children like automobiles. In adoptions, just as in biological reproduction, there are
many wild cards and no guarantees. After all, Adam was God's Son, and even Adam
didn't turn out perfect.").
" Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 29.
191 Such proceedings are likely to have a detrimental psychological, emotional and
mental effect on the child. Bennison, supra note 3, at 912.
"9 For example, judicial interviewing of children may "provide the child with an
opportunity to vent her feelings about the perplexing and anxiety-provoking situation in
which she finds herself." Frederica K. Lombard, Judicial Interviewing of Children in
Custody Cases: An Empirical and Analytical Study, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807, 810
(1984). An additional and more cogent justification for such a procedure is that
"although the child is not technically a party litigant ...[his or] her future may be
profoundly affected by the outcome." Id. at 812.
The alternative dispute-resolution mechanism of mediation evolved due to the
consequence of the traditional adversarial proceedings. Kenneth R. Feinberg,
Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 5, 5 (1989).
Mediation is a "revolutionary approach to ... disputes requiring new teamwork between
legal and mental health professionals" thereby minimizing the possibility for escalation
and compounding of disputes. JANET R. JOHNSON & LINDA E.G. CAMPBELL, IMPASS
OF DIVORCE: THE DYNAMICS AND RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 4-5 (1988).
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IV. Recommendations for Reform
A. Mandatory Disclosure
The amount of information provided to adoptive parents by an
agency is a key factor in determining the success of the adoption.
However, courts are not willing to impose a duty on agencies to
collect and disclose information to prospective parents; such a step
needs to come from the legislature.' 93 One emerging trend is the
enactment of mandatory disclosure laws which, if undertaken, could
benefit adoptive parents. 194 These legislative proposals would require
agencies and intermediaries in the adoption process to provide
adoptive parents with the medical history'95 and background
1 See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 830-31.
"9 See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney 1993) (mandating that
adopting parents be provided with a medical history of the child to be adopted, which
should include information on hereditary diseases, any drugs or medication taken by the
natural mother during pregnancy, and the child's psychological condition); Oino REv.
CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Baldwin 1993) (mandating that the Department of Social
Services undertake an investigation and prepare a report to be provided to prospective
adoptive parents concerning the physical and social condition of the adoptive child and
biological parents); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 222.26, 224.70 (West 1993) (directing that
histories of the adoptive child and biological parents be compiled and made available to
the prospective adoptive parents-the history of the child should include medical reports,
psychological evaluation, scholastic information, developmental history and information
on the child's existing family life); see also Dickson, supra note 20, at 950 n.175 (listing
twenty-one states that have enacted disclosure statutes and discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of disclosure statutes in general); Connelly, supra note 67, at 808-15
(discussing, in detail, the disclosure statutes of California, Arizona, Ohio and Texas, and
mentioning the disclosure statutes of Louisiana, Michigan, Maine, Kentucky, Kansas,
Missouri, and North Carolina).
195 See supra note 194 (discussing statutes that require disclosure of medical history
information). Adoptors are like biological parents and they:
Should have the right to make an informed decision about
parenthood . . . . In many cases, biological parents do have the
opportunity to consider risks involved in bearing offspring. They
may choose to avoid having children if there is a history of
congenital disease in their family; an individual who is HIV positive
can choose to avoid or terminate pregnancy."
Dickson, supra note 20, at 943-44; see Connelly, supra note 67, at 816 (discussing the
policy of informed consent underlying medical disclosure statutes). The requirement of
medical history disclosure is rooted in precedent. The court in Michael J. announced
there should be a standard of good faith, full disclosure of material facts concerning
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information on prospective adoptive children, prior to the final
adoption. 196
The Uniform Adoption Act197 is a current statute that
addresses the best interests of the child. 98 If states intend to
seriously promote the best interests of the child, enactment of this
model Act by all states, along with mandatory disclosure laws, must
eventually be achieved.199 Mandatory disclosure is an ultimate goal
existing or past conditions of the child's health. 247 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
196 See supra note 194 (discussing statutes that require disclosure of information
pertaining to a child's background); see also Dickson, supra note 20, at 922 (contending
that adoptive parents should be given the opportunity to forego adopting children with
injuries stemming from a troubled background).
"7 9 U.L.A. 11-78 (1988). This model Act, originally drafted in 1953, has been
enacted by Alaska, Arkansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Ohio. Bennison,
supra note 3, at 922 n.88. The Act's purpose is to protect and promote "not only the
welfare of children, but also the [biological] parents, and adoptive parents, and thereby
promote the welfare of the state." LEAvy, supra note 3, at 91.
.. See Uniform Adoption Act § 15 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 62 (1988). This comment to the
Act states that "[tihe policy of stability in a family relationship, particularly when a
[child] is involved, outweighs the possible loss to a person whose rights are cut off
through fraud or ignorance." Id.
199 See Bennison, supra note 3, at 922 n.88 (stating that "[a]lthough currently enacted
in five states, enactment of this statute [the Uniform Adoption Act] should be the trend
in the future if states intend to promote the child's best interest."); see also Dickson,
supra note 20, at 955 (stating that "[a] truly adequate law . . . would require a
substantial investigation into the medical, genetic, psychological, behavioral, and
emotional condition of the child").
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because public policy 200 "cannot condone concealment or intentional
misrepresentation that misleads potential adoptive parents. 1201
Opponents of mandatory disclosure laws should be
appropriately advised that requiring agencies to provide adoptive
parents with complete and accurate information on a prospective
adoptive child is not equivalent to promising them a "blue ribbon"
baby. 212 Rather, it is a modest provision which paves the way for
I The court in Michael J. expressed the underlying public policy rationale for
mandatory disclosure:
The adoption of a child is an act of compassion, love and
humanitarian concern where the adoptive parent voluntarily assumes
enormous legal, moral, social and financial obligations.
Accordingly, a trustworthy process benefits society, as well as the
child and parent. As keepers of the conscious of the community
[and as trustees of the child's destiny], we cannot countenance
conduct which would allow persons who desire entrance into the
emotional realm of parenting to be unprotected from schemes or
tactics designed to discharge societal burdens onto the unsuspecting
or unwary.
201 Cal. App. 3d at 859.
201 Bennison, supra note 3, at 929. As an alternative to placing the disclosure
burden solely on an adoption agency, the state should, perhaps, impose an affirmative
duty, as a supplementary safeguard, on prospective parents to arrange a thorough
examination of the child to be adopted. See Dickson, supra note 20,'at 959 n.228
(discussing Richard P., in which tort liability was not imposed on a placement agency
because the adoptive patents relied on their own pediatrician's examination to verify the
agency's report on the adopted child's medical condition). Such implementation of the
mandatory disclosure proposal would make the investigatory requirement a two-way
street. Decreased agency liability would result by requiring the adoptive parents to bear
a portion of the disclosure burden. See Bebensee, supra note 33, at 407-08 (discussing
verification procedures which would act as a check on the type and amount of
information received by prospective adoptive parents).
' See Dickson, supra note 20, at 949 (contending that mandatory disclosure laws
recognize that "adoptions work better when adoptors are fully informed, and that
adoptors should have the right to make a considered decision about what special
parenting responsibilities they are willing or able to take on"). Critics also argue that
too much information may dissuade families from adopting children who might possess
latent abnormalities. Connelly, supra note 67, at 816. However, because of long
adoption waiting lists, many prospective adoptive parents "when faced with a one to two
year wait . . . are willing to adopt a health impaired child provided that they are fully
informed of the child's history." Id.
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adoptive parents to make an informed choice about adoption." 3
Moreover, imposing a duty of reasonable, good faith investigation
and disclosure should not be unduly burdensome." 4 By implementing
more thorough child assessment practices, agencies should be able to
protect themselves from unwarranted liability.2"5 Such a modest
disclosure policy will ultimately benefit both adoptive parents 206 and
children.20 7
The goal of adoption is to create a new legal family with
some semblance of permanence.20 8 The avoidance of annulment
petitions and wrongful adoption actions further upholds the goal of
acting in the child's best interests. It is true that full disclosure may
initially slow the placement process 2 9 but, once placed, rather than
increase the potential for suit, as critics may fear, disclosure would
203 See LeMay, supra note 76, at 487. "The denial of the opportunity to make an
informed choice is the gravamen of the wrongful birth tort. Parents should have a
parallel right to make an informed decision to adopt a child and should be entitled to
recover damages for misrepresentations which deny them this opportunity." Id.; see
Connelly, supra note 67, at 817 (arguing that if adoptive parents are to be treated as the
parents of the child, they should have access to the same information as biological
parents, and should be able to consider a myriad of factors before taking on the same
parental responsibilities).
204 Dickson, supra note 20, at 964; see Foster v. Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 981, 983-84
(Miss. 1990) (holding that in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, where an
agency has done all it could before placing the child by releasing all information
available to the adoptive parents, and where the agency could not have foreseen the
injury or anticipated negligence by medical professionals, the agency cannot be held to
the unreasonable responsibility of guaranteeing the health of the child).
205 See Dickson, supra note 20, at 964.
206 See Connelly, supra note 67, at 821. "The secrecy of the adoption process and
the potentially extraordinary financial and emotional damage to be suffered years after
adoption necessitate the imposition of disclosure rules to protect parents from
underinformed decisionmaking." Id.
'"' Dickson, supra note 20, at 964; see When Love is Not Enough, supra note 7, at
1763-64. "[Flull disclosure of an adopted child's history offers psychological and
practical benefits to the child and to [the child's] family." Id. at 1764; see Connelly,
supra note 67, at 821 (concluding that nondisclosure does not adequately protect the
child).
2 See Bennison, supra note 3, at 909-12.
Id. at 933. But see Connelly, supra note 67, at 816 (stating that "[flaced with a
one- to two-year wait, many people are willing to adopt a health-impaired child,
provided they are fully aware of the child's history").
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likely decrease post-placement adoption litigation by providing clearer
guidelines.
B. Federal Assistance-Supplementing the Current Subsidy
Program
"Leaving adoption to the option of state and local
governmental entities will only continue to deprive
many children of permanent nurturing homes ...
Attention must be directed toward viewing adoption as
a viable alternative for ... children other than white
healthy infants . . . . The problem is national in
scope and so massive that Federal leadership is re-
quired to establish and maintain the expertise which
will solve the problem. 11210
Whether an adoptive parent knowingly petitions for a special-
needs child or if a latent disability manifests itself years after an
adoption has been finalized, the fact remains that the child is a
special-needs child. And, because mandatory disclosure will result
in an increased number of special-needs adoptions, the legislature
must act to make money available for these children in every
circumstance.21 '
Subsidized adoption programs 212 are a relatively new child
welfare option for children in need of long-term substitute care. 213 It
was not until the late 1950s that a formalized concept of subsidized
210 Brooks, supra note 2, at 1130 n.1 (quoting Adoption of Children With Special
Needs: Testimony to Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm.
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1977) (statement of Gerald B. Adcock,
Chairman of Public Policy Committee of the North American Council on Adoptable
Children)).
211 See Brooks, supra note 2, at 1163-64.
212 The term "subsidized adoption" is synonymous with the Adoption Assistance
Program. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 272. For a comprehensive
examination of federal adoption statutes and programs, see Brooks, supra note 2, at
1145-50.
213 Michael D.A. Freeman, Subsidized Adoption, in ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN
ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIOLOGY 203 (Philip Bean ed., 1984).
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adoption received serious attention.2 t4 One federal initiative, the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,215 was the
enabling legislation that authorized federal subsidies to adoptive
parents .216 Now there are state and federal subsidies 217 available for
individuals who adopt children with "special needs. "218 However, the
majority of statutes now in place provide that subsidy assistance is not
applicable to all situations.219 Rather, it applies to the "knowing"
placement of a special-needs child221 where parents enter into subsidy
assistance agreements before the adoption is finalized. 21  This
limitation is the pitfall of the current subsidy program.
Implementation of the current adoption assistance program is neces-
sary and revisions to it should focus on addressing those situations
214 Id.
21S 42 U.S.C. § 673 (1980). Under this statute, monthly payments are made to the
adoptive parents of special-needs children who were adopted through a public agency.
Id. § 673(a)(1)(B)(i). Payment amounts may vary depending on the circumstances. Id.
§ 673(a)(3). Therefore, an open discussion of the needs of the child and the
circumstances of the parents is an important part of the negotiations. Payments will end
when one of several events enumerated by the statute occurs. id. at § 673(a)(4).
216 ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 19. State and federal government share the
cost of these subsidies. Id.
217 42 U.S.C. § 673 (1988). Subsidy assistance is most commonly seen in the form
of one-time payments for adoption-related expenses or tax deductions. See ADAMEC &
PIERCE, supra note 2, at 272. See generally Collins, supra note 28, at 1, 6-7 (stating
that in the case of a special-needs adoption, there are no fees, and the state provides for
the child's needs and certain other expenses); Stock, supra note 31, at 4 (explaining that
New Jersey provides a continuing subsidy for children in the special-needs category);
John H. Cushman, Jr., Your Taxes: Family Values in Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
1992, § 1, at 38 (examining proposed legislation that would provide tax deduction for
adoption-related expenses).
218 42 U.S.C. § 673(c) (1988).
219 If the subsidy is not agreed to and approved before the adoption is finalized,
subsidy assistance may not be an option. LeMay, supra note 76, at 488.
220 See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 266-67.
2' LeMay, supra note 76, at 484. A determination is made of the child's eligibility
prior to the time of adoption and an adoption assistance agreement is drawn upon
between the adopting parents and the state or other public agency. ADAMEC & PIERCE,
supra note 2, at 19.
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whose unusual circumstances would justify an exception to the
general rule.222
Following the lead of states like Arizona, the government
should implement a uniform system of post-placement subsidy
assistance.2' Under such a program, "[at] any time after the
adoption, families may apply for a subsidy for any undiagnosed
preexisting condition which the child is discovered to have."224
Again, a child with special needs is one whose health, temperament
or background make the child difficult to place. These needs exist
regardless of whether the adoptive parent knew of the "condition"
prior to the adoption, or whether the condition later manifests
itself.22 Therefore, the unknowing parent should be entitled to some
form of financial assistance. 226  Advocates of parents' rights plead
that fairness dictates that, as victims, adoptive parents should be
entitled to receive subsidy assistance for their special-needs child,
despite their lack of knowledge of a disability prior to adoption.22 7
Taking this proposal a step further, parents who have been
induced by material misrepresentations 22s or concealment 229 and have
m" mhe adoption assistance agreement will be completed prior to the decree of
adoption. However, there may be unusual circumstances which would justify an
exception to the general rule." LeMay, supra note 76, at 484 (emphasis added)
(quoting Model Act for Adoption of Children With Special Needs, 46 Fed. Reg. §
50.038 (1981)).
22 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-144(D) (1981); see Schiffer, supra note 57, at 709-
10. Similar to the subsidy programs now in place, the post-placement subsidies would
consist of cash payments which vary with the needs and circumstances of the particular
child and family and are subject to periodic review. Id. Additionally, the post-
placement subsidies may include post-adoption services. Id. Post-adoption services
(a/k/a post-legal adoption services) geared toward both child and parent, often make the
difference between a successful and unsuccessful placement. See Brooks, supra note 2,
at 1152. These services include, but are not limited to, psychological testing and
evaluation, counseling, support groups, emergency psychiatric care for the child, and
ongoing training, support and consultation for the parents. Id. at 1152-53. The need
for these post-adoption services is, not surprisingly, greater for parents of special needs
children. ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 2, at 231.
2 Schiffer, supra note 57, at 710.
22 See supra note 30.
26 LeMay, supra note 76, at 485.
227 Id. at 484.
228 See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 12.1-27 and accompanying text.
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not knowingly agreed to a special needs adoption, are forced to incur
the same financial obligations as a parent who had the benefit of
knowingly entering into such an adoption. Yet, as victims of a
system fraught with inadequacies, these parents are not entitled to
recieve the benefits of the current subsidy programs.
On a larger scale, post-placement subsidy assistance could
take the form of compensatory damages 230 "awarded" to parents who
have met their burden of successfully proving a case of agency fraud
or misrepresentation, whether prior or subsequent to the final
adoption decree. Payment of such damages would be taken from a
proposed subsidy fund.' In essence, the parents' recovery is
equivalent to recovery in a wrongful adoption suit where parents are
fully compensated for their resulting injury.232 More importantly,
however, this non-adversarial procedure avoids subjecting the child
to litigation.23
Unfortunately, the idea of subsidizing adoption is looked at
with some disfavor and opponents often gather on two points-cose 34
and economic fairness.235 With respect to the latter, the arguments
proffered center on a concern that adoptive parents of children with
230 Again, the extent of recovery has been debated. See supra note 101. However,
recovery should be restricted to the cost of extraordinary and unusual medical expenses
because a message needs to be sent to adoptive parents that any action taken on behalf
of the child is for the benefit of the child. See Schwartz, supra note 31, at 833.
"' LeMay, supra note 76, at 485. In theory, the proposed subsidy program
expansion to include actions for subsequent discovery of the adoptive child's disability
seems uncomplicated. In practice, however, implementing the current subsidy scheme
is likely to be somewhat problematic. See Lisa Sorg-Friedman, Few Agencies Track
Effectiveness of Children's Mental Health Care, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC/THE PHOENIX
GAZETTE, August 18, 1993, at 6. Not surprisingly, therefore, the idea has met with
disagreement: "Even if a particular jurisdiction provides that subsidy payments are
available . . .where a physical or mental problem is discovered [subsequent] to
adoption, subsidy payments may not be satisfactory to a parent who has been the victim
of misrepresentation and seeks recourse for the injury." Id.
2 But see sources cited supra note 101.
233 See supra part III.
z-' Carol Lawson, Getting Congress to Support Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1991, at Cl. "[Tihe Budget Enforcement Act places severe restrictions on tax legislation
that is scored as losing revenue." Id.
235 Freeman, supra note 213, at 207.
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special needs should not receive "special" treatment.236  In
consideration of the interest being protected, such a rationale is
disturbingly callous. As to the cost consideration, proponents of the
program can allay the fears of doubters by demonstrating that
adoption subsidies are more cost-effective than other long-term
proposals.237
Although the character of adoption has changed, the current
system has not provided a new approach to deal with the increased
number of children with special needs. The idea of paying adoptive
parents still meets with resistance.238 If subsidized adoption is to be
a genuine child care option, designed for children in need, allowance
should attach to the child, for the benefit of the child, not to or for
the adoptive parents.2 3' And, since children are our nation's most
precious resource, we must strive to convince society and lawmakers
236 Id. (stating that opponents maintain that adoptive parents of special-needs children
should not be subsidized in their nurturing responsibilities when the majority of adoptive
parents are not similarly supported). In a similar vein, some assert that "if adoptive
families [are] to mirror birth families . .. they should be similarly treated ... [and]
receive no more allowance for the upbringing and support of [adoptees] than [natural]
parents did for their own children." Id. at 203.
237 FEIGELMAN & SILVERMAN, supra note 45, at 29. Foster care is the largest single
item in the child welfare budget. Id. It is generally acknowledged to be one of the least
expensive alternatives offered to children living apart from their families. Id. By
promoting the adoptions of many of these children, even where some adoptions would
be subsidized, costs could be greatly reduced, especially in the long term. Id.
m Those who adamantly oppose the payment of allowances express a concern "that
adoption should be undertaken for love not money." Freeman, supra note 213, at 206
(emphasis added). However, the belief that adoptive parents can profit from subsidized
adoption is "far wide of the mark." Id. But, the concept of paying adoptive parents
is becoming more acceptable to policymakers. See Lawson, supra note 234, at Cl.
Illustrative of policymaker initiative, specifically congressional action, are the following
proposals: (1) Senator Orin Hatch (R. Utah) proposed legislation calling for an increase
in the maximum tax deduction to $5000, providing for unreimbursed and legitimate
adoption expenses; (2) Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D. Texas) proposed a $3000 tax
deduction for adoption of disabled children; and (3) Representative, Christopher H.
Smith (R. New Jersey) participated in the Omnibus Adoption Act of 1991, com-
prehensive adoption legislation providing for, in part, tax credit for adoption expenses,
benefits to federal employees who adopt, and grants to develop educational programs
regarding adoption. Id. at Cl, C5.
239 Freeman, supra note 213, at 221.
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that public funding for all phases of adoption proceedings is in the
public interest.24
Conclusion
This Note has discussed annulment and wrongful adoption,
two remedies available to adoptive parents who have been the victims
of fraud and nondisclosure throughout the adoption proceeding. In
light of the possible detrimental effects on the child resulting from
wrongful adoption litigation, this Note has proposed various
approaches to reform which are aimed at fully protecting the child,
namely, mandatory disclosure and subsidy assistance. Holding
adoption agencies to a mandatory duty of disclosure and
implementing a program which provides financial subsidies to
adoptive parents, who knowingly adopt a special-needs child or who
subsequently discover they have adopted a special-needs child,
thereby avoiding post-placement litigation, enhances the effectiveness
of the adoption process overall and is clearly in society's best
interest.
In the present reality of adoption, most children have special
needs. Lacking the resources to provide these children with the
necessary resources, states are creating counter-productive situations
by providing parents with detrimental alternatives-annulment
proceedings and post-placement litigation involving the child and
focusing on the child's special needs. In an attempt to avoid
litigation, increased federal support for special needs children is
necessary. The cost of caring for troubled and unwanted children
-special children with special needs-should be borne by all of
society. The proposed adoption schemes are not beyond
implementation.
Fran Pfeifer Pero
240 Id. at 205.
